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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
JoNATHAN SHIRLEY* 
Abstract: This Note examines the international implications of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). First, it identifies the relevant 
provisions of SOX and its impact on securities regulation generally. 
Second, it discusses how SOX impacts foreign companies that list 
securities on U.S. exchanges. Third, it analyzes how SOX is different 
from other U.S. securities regulations and discusses the consequences of 
its extraterritorial application. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), signed into law on July 
30, 2002,1 was a response by U.S.legislators to a string of scandals that 
revealed corruption in corporate America and the securities markets.2 
Initially, the collapse of Enron in late 2001 prompted the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to propose rule changes to federal 
securities law.3 However, the subsequent disclosure of accounting ir-
regularities and management deception at corporations such as 
Global Crossing, Adelphia, and WorldCom revealed systemic prob-
lems in the legal framework of securities regulation that required 
Congressional legislative action.4 
The speed with which SOX became law was startling. Many ob-
servers were troubled by the apparent lack of consideration for SOX's 
impact abroad.5 A number of SOX's provisions place foreign corpora-
tions in the unenviable position of having to comply with U.S. laws 
*Jonathan Shirley is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
2 Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Convergence to Comity in C01porate Law: Lessons from the 
Inauspicious Case of SOX, 1 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GovERNANCE (forthcoming 2004), 
http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract=462142 (manuscript at 3). 
3 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-0XLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE§ 9 (2002). 
4 See jAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-0XLEY AcT OF 2002: LAW AND 
ExPLANATION 13 (2002). 
5 Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1. 
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that directly conflict with their own domestic regulations.6 This Note 
explores the nature of these conflicts and how SOX fits within the ex-
traterritorial framework of U.S. securities regulation. Part I provides a 
brief summary of the context in which SOX was enacted and its im-
plications for corporate governance and securities markets in the 
United States. Part II examines the different ways SOX conflicts with 
foreign corporate governance laws. It also explores the territorial 
reach of U.S. securities law before SOX. Part III analyzes the extrater-
ritorial nature of SOX and how its provisions diverge from traditional 
securities regulations. This Note concludes that although SOX does 
not expand the territorial scope of securities law, its regulation of 
corporate governance does raise comity concerns. Nevertheless, these 
concerns will not have a lasting impact on the desire of foreign issuers 
to enter U.S. capital markets. 
J. BACKGROUND 
A. The Context of SOX 
In many respects, SOX is a strict response to the specific account-
ing and governance problems that were at the root of the corporate 
scandals in 2001 and 2002.7 A brief review of these scandals provides 
context to SOX and its legislative intent. 
1. The Collapse of Enron and Its Ilk 
In the fall of 2001 and spring of 2002, revelations of management 
deception and abuse at Fortune 500 companies reached a feverish 
pace.8 In October 2001, the Enron Corporation disclosed that it had 
lost $1.01 billion due to failed investments.9 By December, it had filed 
a Chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy that reported $13.15 billion in 
debts. 10 Enron's petition represented the largest bankruptcy in U.S. 
history at the time.ll An investigation by an Enron special committee 
later revealed that the company had used special purpose entities 
(SPEs) to conceal another $27 billion in liabilities and operating 
6 Seeid. at 9-10. 
7 See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 3, § 1. 
8 See id. 
9 !d. 
10 !d. 
II Jd. 
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losses from the market. 12 These losses were mostly linked to the pri-
vate limited investment partnerships that, according to the SEC, were 
used to misappropriate millions of dollars of undisclosed fees.13 
As events at Enron were unfolding, other seemingly stable and re-
spected U.S. corporations began to crumble.14 In December 2001, 
Global Crossing, Inc. disclosed that it was experiencing financial trou-
bles.15 Global Crossing had staked its fortune in the late 1990s on the 
risky proposition that a world-wide fiber optic network was required to 
support the vast sums of data being exchanged around the world 
through the Internet. 16 By 2000, Global Crossing had grown rapidly 
and boasted a market capitalization of $48 billion and revenue of $3.3 
billion.17 In mid-December 2001, however, the company announced it 
would halt dividend payments and refuse to honor loan agreements 
totaling $400 million.18 Global Crossing filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy in January 2002, listing assets of $22.4 billion and liabilities of 
$12.4 billion.'9 Although the bankruptcy petition gave the appearance 
of $10 billion in surplus assets, most of it was related to essentially 
worthless in tangible goodwill. 20 
The rapid revenue growth that fueled Global Crossing's stock 
valuation was a mere illusion.21 The company boosted its revenues by 
using transactions known within the industry as "swaps. "22 In these 
transactions, Global Crossing sold its network capacity to other tele-
communications operators.23 At the same time, however, it purchased 
an equal amount of network capacity from those operators.24 Hence, 
these "swaps" were cashless transactions that had no real economic 
12 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 3, § 1. 
13 Id. 
14 Dennis K. Berman et al., Global Crossing Ltd. Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 
2002, at A3 [hereinafter Global Crossing Article]. 
15 Id. 
16 See Andy Kessler, Winnick's Voyage to the Bottom of the Sea, WALL ST. J ., Mar. 21, 2002, at 
A22. 
17 Dennis K. Berman, Andersen's 'Swaps' Method Draws Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 
2002, at A3 [hereinafter Andersen's 'Swaps' Article]. 
18 Global Crossing Article, supra note 14. 
19 Id. 
2° Kessler, supra note 16. Goodwill represents "[a] business's reputation, patronage, 
and other intangible assets that are considered when appraising the business, esp. for pur-
chase." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 557 (7th ed. abr. 2000). 
21 See Andersen's 'Swaps' Article, supra note 17. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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value.25 Nonetheless, the company immediately reported its "sale" as 
revenue and wrote off the "purchase" as an expense.26 This accounting 
maneuver gave Global Crossing's operating results, a key indicator on 
Wall Street, the appearance of rising revenues without any correspond-
ing liabilities. 27 
Troubling disclosures by other companies in the spring of 2002 
also highlighted deep conflicts of interest in corporate boardrooms.28 
For example, Adelphia, Inc., a leading U.S. cable company, was one of 
the largest cases of insider dealing ever in a public company.29 It an-
nounced in the spring of 2002 that $2.3 billion in debt related to 
partnerships owned by the Rigas family, the company's founder, had 
not been disclosed on the company's balance sheet.30 Although, like 
Enron, Adelphia used these partnerships to hide debt from its bal-
ance sheet, it did so to serve a different end.31 Federal prosecutors 
and auditors uncovered a vast network of business relationships be-
tween the company and the Rigas family as well as a complex corpo-
rate cash management system that functioned like the family's per-
sonal bank.32 The company made cash advances and guaranteed loans 
for the family's other business ventures, which included a golf course, 
timber investment, hockey franchise, furniture store, and an inde-
pendently produced film. 33 The nine member board, consisting of 
four outside directors, claimed that it was aware of the family's bor-
rowing arrangements, but that it had never been informed of the 
other business transactions.34 
In June 2002, WorldCom, one of the nation's largest telecommu-
nications companies, announced that it had overstated its income in 
2001 and the first quarter of 2002 by $3.8 billion.35 The company also 
disclosed that an additional $3.3 billion had been improperly recorded 
as earnings in 2000 and 1999 and that the company's goodwill and 
25 !d. 
26 Andersen's 'Swaps' Article, supra note 17. 
27 Id. 
28 See Robert Frank & Deborah Solomon, Adelphia and Rigas Family Had a Vast Network 
of Business Ties, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Vast Network Article]. 
29 Id. 
30 Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank, Adelphia is Weighing Plans to Sell Assets After Dis-
closing OffBalance Sheet Debt, WALL ST.j., Apr. 1, 2002, at A3. 
31 See Vast Network Article, supra note 28. 
32 ld. 
33 Id. 
34 ld. 
35 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 3, § 6. 
-------------------
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other intangible assets had declined by $50.6 billion.36 Despite the stag-
gering amount of money involved, WorldCom executives perpetrated 
the fraud with relative ease.37 By classifYing operating expenses as capi-
tal expenditures, the executives made WorldCom's balance sheet ap-
pear to have far fewer liabilities than assets.38 Thus, the balance sheet 
greatly overstated the company's actual value.39 On July 21, 2002, 
WorldCom filed a bankruptcy petition that listed debt of $41 billion, 
which surpassed Enron as the largest bankruptcy petition in history.40 
2. The Creation of Sarbanes-Oxley 
The Bush Administration pushed for a tough regulatory response 
in the wake of Enron's collapse.41 Harvey Pitt, then Chairman of the 
SEC, proposed the creation of a public accounting board that would 
provide oversight of accountants practicing before the SEC.42 In addi-
tion, Pitt asked Congress for legislation to extend the SEC's authority, 
where necessary, to better patrol the securities markets.43 
A legislative response to the crisis in investor confidence devel-
oped quickly. By March 8, 2002, over thirty "Enron-inspired" bills had 
been introduced in Congress.44 Mter WorldCom's disclosure on June 
25, 2002, the arrays of competing bills were quickly reconciled.45 By 
July 24, 2002, a final bill was crafted by the Conference Committee of 
the House and Senate and passed by Congress the following day. 46 
The Act was signed by President Bush five days later.47 
B. An Overview of the Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act 
SOX addresses a range of corporate governance, accounting, and 
securities issues.48 It impacts corporate law in five major respects: (1) 
56 Id. 
s7 Id. 
ss I d. 
59 See id. 
40 BLOOMENTIIAL, supra note 3, § 6. 
41 See id. § 2. 
42 Id. § 9. 
43 Accounting Issues and Enron Collapse: Hearing On ''Accounting and Investor Protection Is-
sues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies, "107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Harvey 
L. Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
44 BLOOMENTIIAL, supra note 3, § 9. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 SeeSarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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accounting oversight (through the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board); (2) auditor independence; (3) corporate governance; 
(4) disclosure requirements; and (5) criminal penalties.49 Each of 
these categories is examined below. 
1. Accounting Oversight 
Before SOX, the auditing profession was mostly self-regulated: it po-
liced the audit process, set private auditing and accounting standards, and 
conducted private disciplinary measures.50 These self-regulating nmc-
tions, however, were funded through voluntary fees paid by the auditing 
firms.51 Therefore, true independent auditor oversight did not exist un-
der this regime because funding could be withheld by the very constitu-
ents that had a stake in the outcome of the process.52 
Title I of SOX establishes the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board (PCAOB), which has the authority to regulate auditors of 
public companies, set auditing standards, and investigate violations.53 
The board is independent from the industry.54 For example, funding 
for PCAOB is derived from mandatory fees paid by the auditing com-
panies.55 This is a significant change from the voluntary fee arrange-
ment because the effectiveness of the board's oversight is not de-
pendent on the industry's willing cooperation.56 Moreover, board 
members must have limited contacts with the profession-only two 
members of the board may be certified public accountants and all 
members must serve full-time and have no other employment.57 
The PCAOB's authority also extends to foreign accounting 
firms. 58 Foreign accounting firms that prepare or furnish audit re-
ports concerning an issuer59 are deemed by SOX to have consented to 
producing their audit work papers and being subject to federal court 
49 See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 4, at 13-14. This Note does not attempt to 
discuss all aspects of the Act but merely mentions its most significant elements. 
50 ld. at 14. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 27-28 (citing testimony of former SEC Chief Accountant Michael Sutton be-
fore the Senate Committee). 
53 SeeSarbanes-Oxley Act§§ 101-109. 
54 See id. § 101. 
55 ld. § 109. 
56 HAMIL TON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 4, at 14. 
5i Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 101. 
58 ld. § 106. 
59 "Issuer" is defined by the Act as a company that has registered securities on U.S. ex-
change. Id. § 2. 
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jurisdiction for enforcement of any request to produce those papers.60 
While foreign accounting firms already must comply with U.S. ac-
counting rules and securities laws, SOX subjects them to PCAOB in-
spection every three years to asses their "degree of compliance" with 
SOX itself, PCAOB rules, SEC rules, professional standards, and the 
firms' quality control policies.61 
2. Auditor Independence 
Auditors are paid by the companies they audit.62 Thus, an im-
plicit conflict in the relationship between the auditor and the audit 
client exists.63 Nevertheless, because the nature of the audit relation-
ship makes it unavoidable, this conflict of interest is tolerated.64 
The degree of this conflict in the auditor-client relationship, 
however, changed dramatically in the 1990s as auditing firms began 
providing management consulting services.65 This change was due to 
the fact that management consulting services generated far greater 
fees than auditing.66 As a consequence, to continue the lucrative 
management consulting projects, auditors needed to maintain good 
relations with their clients.67 This tension naturally eroded the audi-
tor's independence because a critical audit would only dampen that 
relationship.68 As one commentator noted, "an accountant finds it 
very difficult to sound off about a client's financial shenanigans if he 
needs the client's far more lucrative consulting business."69 Moreover, 
by auditing the same companies for which they provided consulting, 
auditors placed themselves in the awkward position of auditing their 
own work.70 Hence, their objectivity was also sacrificed.71 
SOX attempts to correct the balance in the auditor-client rela-
tionship by prohibiting an auditor for a public company from provid-
60 Id. § 106. 
61 Id. § 104. 
62 See LAWRENCE A. CuNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY AccouNTING & FINANCE FOR LAw-
YERS 259 (3d ed. 2002). 
63 HAMILTON & 'TRAUTMANN, supra note 4, at 48. 
64 See id. 
65 Id. 
66 See Leah Nathans Spiro, Ethics and Anderson Didn't Add Up, WALL ST.]., Mar. 20, 
2003, atDS. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 Id. 
70 See HAMIL TON & 'TRAUTMANN, supra note 4, at 49. 
71 See id. 
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ing a variety of services contemporaneously with the audit.72 Such 
prohibited services include: (1) bookkeeping; (2) design and imple-
mentation of financial information systems; (3) appraisal or valuation 
services; (4) actuarial services; (5) management functions or human 
resources; (6) investment adviser or investment banking services; and 
(7) legal services and expert services related to the audit.73 
Moreover, SOX requires that auditing firms rotate the lead audit-
ing partners in charge of a respective corporate client every five 
years.74 This measure ensures that "fresh and skeptical eyes" evaluate 
the company on a periodic basis.75 SOX also requires that the General 
Accounting Office conduct a study to determine whether companies 
should be required to rotate audit firms after a certain number of 
years.76 Thus, even more stringent rotation requirements may still be 
forthcoming from the SEC. 77 
3. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance refers to the important legal relationship 
that exists between shareholders, management, auditors, and the board 
of directors.78 A company's management governs the company under 
the supervision of the board of directors and for the benefit of its 
shareholders. 79 Auditors ensure that the management complies with 
accounting standards, thereby providing shareholders and prospective 
investors with an accurate understanding of the company's financial 
health.so 
One factor that contributed to the breakdown of the auditing 
process in the last few years was auditors' misperception that their 
main responsibility was to serve company management rather than 
the board of directors, which acts as trustees of the company's share-
holders.81 Consequently, SOX takes a two-step approach to reestablish 
the proper dynamic between an auditor and its client and to sever 
72 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. § 203. 
75 HAMILTON & 'TRAUTMANN, sttpra note 4, at 52. 
76 Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 207. 
77 See id. 
78 See RoBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAw oF CoRPORATIONS IN A NuTSHELL 156--75 
(1991). 
79 See id. 
80 See HAMILTON & 'TRAUTMANN, supra note 4, at 47. 
81 See id. at 56. 
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management's overt influence over auditing functions.s2 First, SOX 
requires that a company's audit committee, which is established by 
the board of directors, be solely responsible for appointing, compen-
sating, and overseeing the work of the auditing firm.83 Moreover, the 
audit firm must report directly to the audit committee.84 Second, the 
auditing committee must consist of independent members of the 
board of directors who accept no consulting fees and have no 
affiliations with the company or its subsidiaries. 85 
To further ensure investor confidence in financial statements, 
SOX requires CEOs and CFOs to attest to the accuracy of quarterly 
financial disclosures.86 Such certifications represent an acknowledg-
ment by the executives that the quarterly financial disclosure fairly 
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of 
operations of the company for the period reported.87 Criminal penal-
ties of up to $5 million and twenty years imprisonment result from a 
willful violation of this requirement. 88 
SOX also regulates attorney conduct and professional responsi-
bility by requiring an attorney to report evidence of corporate mis-
conduct to either the chieflegal counsel or the CE0.89 If, after report-
ing the misconduct, neither executive officer acts to rectify the 
conduct, the lawyer is obligated to report the misconduct directly to 
the board of directors.90 However, the scope of this requirement is 
somewhat limited in its reach.91 For example, a lawyer must only re-
port evidence of a material violation of the law, i.e., a violation that 
would require disclosure to a reasonable investor.92 Moreover, once 
the violation is reported, SOX does not specify how the CEO or chief 
counsel should act to rectify the problem.93 
82 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 301. 
83 Id. 
114 Id. § 204. 
85 Id. § 301. 
86 Id. § 302. 
87 Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 302. 
86 I d.§ 906. 
89 Id. § 307. 
90 Id. 
91 See id. 
92 HAMIL TON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 4, at 61. 
93 Id. 
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4. Disclosure Requirements 
SOX addresses four key areas of financial reporting that were 
heavily exploited by Enron and other companies. 94 First, to allow inves-
tors to better understand and gauge a company's financial perform-
ance, companies reporting pro forma95 (or expected) financial results 
must simultaneously reconcile those results to comparable financial 
data calculated according to generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP).96 Second, to close a loophole that came to light through the 
Enron investigation, companies must disclose all material transactions 
with entities that are not included in the calculation of their balance 
sheet and that may have a material effect on their financial condition.97 
Third, to limit loan abuses and hidden compensation that caused the 
collapse of companies like Adelphia, companies are barred from mak-
ing loans to their executives.98 Finally, to significantly increase investor 
awareness of insider activities, insider transactions by directors, officers, 
and ten percent shareholders must be reported to the SEC by the end 
of the second day following the transaction.99 
5. Criminal Penalties 
SOX amends a number of criminal laws related to corporate gov-
ernance malfeasance and securities fraud. 10° For example, one provi-
sion of SOX makes it unlawful to knowingly execute or attempt to exe-
cute a "scheme or artifice ... to defraud any person in connection with 
any security of an issuer. "101 In contrast, under the SEC's longstanding 
lOb-5 anti-fraud provision, a violation only occurs if it is "in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security."102 Thus, SOX's new "scheme 
94 SeeSarbanes-Oxley Act§§ 401-403 
95 Pro forma results are often described to be "as if" results, i.e., they reflect a company's 
hypothetical performance had certain actual one-time events and expenses not occurred. 
Pro forma results do not conform to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). See 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Cautionary Advice Regarding the Use of "Pro Forma" 
Financial Information in Earnings Releases, at http:/ /www.sec.gov/ rules/other/33-8039. 
htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
96 Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 401. GAAP refers to a combination of authoritative standards, 
set by standard-setting bodies, and the accepted ways of doing accounting. See jAMES D. 
Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, AccOUNTING AND TilE LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 6-7 
(1980). 
97 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401. 
98 Id. § 402. 
99 Id. § 403. 
100 See id. § 807. 
101 Jd. 
1o2 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). 
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or artifice" crime may make it easier for prosecutors to prove securities 
fraud because a purchase or sale of a security is not required.l03 
SOX also establishes two new criminal statutes that clarifY penal-
ties for destroying audit records. 104 First, the destruction or creation 
of evidence with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation carries a 
maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment.l05 Second, a willful 
failure to preserve, for a minimum of five years, audit or review work 
papers of companies that issue securities carries a maximum penalty 
of ten years imprisonmen t,I06 
Furthermore, SOX lengthens the time period under which indi-
viduals can sue for securities fraud.l07 Actions may now be brought 
either five years from the date of the fraud or two years from the date 
of its discovery, whichever is earlier.108 Judgments and settlements 
based on securities law violations have also been made nondischarge-
able under the bankruptcy code.I09 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Impact of SOX Abroad 
Although U.S. legislators were responding to domestic corporate 
corruption when they enacted SOX, its impact is global.110 More than 
1300 foreign corporations that list securities on U.S. exchanges are 
affected. 111 Moreover, the Act's extraterritorial reach creates a com-
plicated regulatory environment for foreign corporations.m Listed 
below are some examples of SOX's impact abroad. 
1. Germany and japan 
SOX emphasizes principles of independence and individual ac-
countability in corporate governance.113 These principles conflict 
103 See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supm note 4, at 81. 
104 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802. 
105 !d. 
106 !d. 
10' See id. § 804. 
108 !d. 
109 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 803. 
11o See Cunningham, supm note 2, at 4. 
lll Craig Karmin & Kevin Delaney, U.S. Regulator Wins Some Pmise For Govemance Law 
Exemptions, WALL ST.j.,Jan. 13, 2003, at Ml. 
112 See Tamara Loomis, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, NEw YoRK LAw JouRNAL, jan. 2, 2003, at 5. 
113 SeeSarbanes-Oxley Act§§ 301-302. 
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most notably with German and Japanese corporations, where corpo-
rate governance is rooted in a collective decision-making structure.114 
Thirty-one German corporations list securities on U.S. exchanges, 
aggregating $287 billion in market capitalization.115 This places Ger-
many near the top of the list of European countries with foreign SEC 
registrants.ll6 Furthermore, Germany's direct foreign investment in the 
United States is estimated at $35 billion.117 Yet, among European coun-
tries, Germany's corporate governance laws appear the least amenable 
to the imposition of enhanced l).S. regulation.118 One obvious example 
is Germany's two-tiered corporate board structure.119 The board of 
management is in charge of the day-to-day operations, while the super-
visory board, which by law must seat a minimum number of employee 
representatives, oversees the board ofmanagement.12o 
This board structure conflicts with SOX because of the differing 
nature of accountability that exists in U.S. and German corporate 
governance systems.121 First, SOX requires that a corporation's board 
of directors establish an audit committee staffed by independent 
board members.122 SOX defines an independent board member as 
being an individual who is not employed by the company as either an 
employee or consultant.123 Both boards of a German corporation, 
however, are populated by employees and managers of the com-
pany.124 Moreover, under German law, either of the two boards can 
perform the audit function.l25 Thus, German corporations have a 
board structure that does not easily accommodate the auditing proc-
ess as mandated by SOX.126 Second, SOX requires a company's CEO 
and CFO to certify the company's financial results.l27 Under German 
law, however, both boards of a corporation must certifY the financial 
114 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 8, 13. 
115 See id. at 5 n.9. 
116 See id. 
117 United States German Embassy Website, at http:/ /www.germany-info.org/relaunch 
/politics/german_us/facts.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
118 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 8. 
119 See Rolf Birk, Germany, in THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PuBLICLY 
HELD CoRPORATIONs: A CoMPARATIVE APPROACH 53, 62-64 (Arthur R. Pinto & Gustavo 
Visentini eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE LEGAL BASIS OF CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE). 
120 Jd. 
121 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 11. 
122 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
123 ld. 
124 Birk, supra note 119, at 58-60. 
125 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 8 n.30. 
126 See id. at 8. 
127 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302. 
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results.128 Although this second conflict appears superficial, it does 
reflect a tension between the United States' emphasis on individual 
accountability and Germany's emphasis on collective accountability.I29 
Japanese corporations also have a significant presence in U.S. se-
curities markets. 130 Thirty Japanese public corporations have U.S. listed 
securities, aggregating $420 billion in market capitalization.l31 Like 
Germany, the Japanese corporate structure does not easily accommo-
date SOX requirements because it too emphasizes collective responsi-
bility.132 One problem is that SOX applies terms that simply have no 
equivalent inJapan.133 For example, SOX often uses the term "officers" 
to refer to the management of the company.l34 In Japan, corporations 
are run by boards of directors that are divided into complex hierarchies 
of committees.I35 These committees, in turn, govern the corporation 
through collective decision-making.136 Thus, those who would be con-
sidered officers in the United States are really board members in Japan 
who operate through a committee.I37 
Moreover, the auditing function in Japan is performed in a 
markedly different fashion. 138 Whereas SOX requires independent 
board members to appoint and supervise an outside auditing firm, 
Japan's Commercial Code not only allows the auditing function to be 
performed by non-independent committee members, but it requires 
that the shareholders select the outside auditors.139 Like Germany, 
this conflict with SOX may be more superficial than real, but it 
reflects Japan's very different approach to corporate governance than 
that envisioned by SOX,l40 
12s Craig Karmin & Kate Kelly, Appeal of U.S. Ma1'kets Wanes, WALL ST.j., Nov. 13, 2002, 
at MI. 
129 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 11. 
1!10 See id. at 5 n.10. 
181 !d. 
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2. The Fiduciary Duty and Auditor Rotation 
The translation of SOX abroad also presents more generalized 
difficulties. 141 For example, the notion of a fiduciary duty of care is a 
relatively novel concept in many civil law countries.142 The duty of 
care refers to the level of attentiveness and prudence that managers 
must take in performing their decision-making and supervisory func-
tions.l43 This duty has been refined in the United States through 
common law to protect investors in a variety of corporate events, e.g., 
proxy contests, mergers, and hostile takeovers.l44 
Civil law countries, however, have not so finely developed the 
duty of care because they have other means to police management.145 
In France, for instance, the state has traditionally taken a controlling 
interest in large corporations.146 This control enables the state to en-
sure that management is attentive and prudent without having to re-
sort to the courts.l47 
This variation in the definition of the duty of care will inevitably 
lead to confusion.148 For instance, SOX requires attorneys to report 
evidence of corporate misconduct.149 If that misconduct occurs in a 
French corporation and it relates to the duty of care, what standard of 
the duty of care is the attorney to use? The standard honed through 
U.S. law or that of French law? Such difficult questions have no an-
swer as of yet. 150 
Moreover, rotating auditors every five years, as is required under 
SOX, poses a significant problem for companies in developing coun-
tries where accountants are scarce.l51 In China, for example, there is 
approximately one certified public accountant per 13,000 persons.152 
This compares to one certified public accountant per 1000 persons in 
the United States.153 Therefore, finding a replacement auditor that 
141 See Loomis, supra note 112. 
142 !d. 
143 LEWIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS 195 (3d ed. 1999). 
144 James A Fan to, France, in THE LEGAL BAsis OF CoRPORATE GovERNANCE, supra note 
119, at 22. 
145 !d. at 23. 
146 !d. at 7. 
147 See id. at 23. 
148 See Loomis, supra note 112. 
149 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
150 See Loomis, supra note 142. 
151 !d. 
152 !d. 
153 !d. 
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can competently address a corporation's needs may be a practical im-
possibility in such regions.154 
B. The Territorial Application of U.S. Securities Law Before SOX 
The imposition of SOX on foreign corporations has prompted ob-
jections from all corners of the world even from countries whose laws 
do not outwardly conflict with SOX.155 However, the fact that U.S. secu-
rities laws apply to corporations outside the United States is neither a 
radical nor recent development.l56 To understand how SOX fits into 
the U.S. securities regulatory regime and why it is so controversial 
abroad, it is important to explore the territoriality of U.S. securities law 
before SOX and understand how comityl57 shaped its boundaries.15s 
A dichotomy existed in the extraterritorial application of securi-
ties regulation before SOX.159 Whereas the SEC limited the territorial 
reach of registration requirements, U.S. courts crafted jurisdictional 
tests for the anti-fraud provisions that allowed for their broad extra-
territorial application.160 Although SOX does not disturb this territo-
rial framework, it does raise other comity concerns.161 
I. Securities Registration 
Initially, the territorial reach of U.S. secunttes registration re-
quirements was not an important issue in foreign capital markets.l62 
Once a global marketplace emerged, however, the SEC took steps to 
clarify when foreign securities issuers fell within the United States' 
jurisdiction.163 
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires a company issuing 
securities to register the securities with the SEC any time the instru-
154 See id. 
155 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 12. 
156 See Kellye Y Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 
45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 932-58 (1994). 
157 Comity is defined as the informal and non mandatory courtesy sometimes referred to 
as a set of rules to which the courts of one sovereignty often defer in determining questions 
where the laws and interests of another sovereignty are involved. WEBSTER's THIRD NEw 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 455 (Philip B. Grove ed., 1986). 
158 See Testy, supra note 156, at 932-58. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 SeeSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
162 See Testy, supra note 156, at 928. 
163 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Title I, § 5, 48 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77e (2002)). 
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mentalities of interstate commerce are directly or indirectly used to 
offer or to sell those securities.164 The term "interstate commerce" in 
this context is defined to mean not only commerce among states but 
commerce between a state and a foreign country.165 This language 
could be broadly construed to apply to foreign securities transactions 
that have only the barest relationship (like a single telephone call) to 
the United States.l66 
Until recently, the SEC had provided only minimal guidance on 
the territorial reach of Section 5.167 As a result, foreign issuers were of-
ten reluctant to allow U.S. investors to participate in offerings for fear 
that the securities would then be subject to the burdensome U.S. regis-
tration require men ts.168 Consequently, U.S. investors found it difficult 
to access foreign securities offerings, a problem that became more 
prevalent as foreign issuances increased in the 1970s and 1980s.169 
Before 1990, foreign and domestic companies had to rely on SEC 
Release 4 708 and an extensive body of no-action letters (which are non-
binding statements from the SEC) to determine whether their security 
offerings were subject to U.S. registration requirements. 170 Release 
4 708, issued by the SEC in 1964, indicated that the Commission would 
not take enforcement action against a domestic issuer who failed to reg-
ister securities sold to foreign nationals provided that the securities 
" [came] to rest" abroad.17l The guiding principle behind this Release 
was to guard against unregistered securities sold abroad from flowing 
back to the United States and into the hands of unprotected U.S. inves-
tors.l72 Furthermore, subsequent interpretive letters made it clear that 
the SEC viewed its registration requirements as having extraterritorial 
reach so as to protect U.S. investors, regardless of their physical loca-
tionP3 
Release 4 708, however, did not define the requirement of a secu-
rity coming to rest abroad.174 Thus, foreign issuers were given little 
guidance as to what circumstances would require their securities to be 
164 !d. 
165 Id. § 77b(a)(7). 
166 Testy, supra note 156, at 939. 
167 See id. 
168 !d. at 940-41. 
169 !d. 
170 Id. at 939. 
171 Testy, supra note 156, at 940. 
172 !d. 
173 !d. 
174 ld. 
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registered in the United States.175 Their concern focused in particular 
on how and when securities sold in an offering to non-U.S. nationals 
could be resold to either a person in the United States or a U.S. na-
tional outside the United States.176 
In 1985, the SEC issued a no-action letter regarding InfraRed As-
sociates that reflected an understanding that the globalization of 
financial markets required that Section 5 be constrained so as not to 
interfere with the laws of other nations.177 Specifically, the letter ap-
proved the resale of non-U.S. registered securities to U.S. investors on 
a foreign stock exchange but only after the expiration of a specified 
restriction periodP8 As U.S. investor demand for access to global 
markets increased in the late 1980s, the SEC took further steps to clar-
ify the territorial reach of Section 5.179 These steps ultimately resulted 
in the adoption of RegulationS in 1990.18° 
Regulation S codified the territorial reach of Section 5 and pro-
vided specific guidelines for offshore offerings to be exempt from regis-
tration requirements, thereby making compliance by issuers more cer-
tain.181 In particular, Regulation S set forth two conditions for the 
issuance and resale of unregistered securities: ( 1) the offer or sale must 
be made in an "offshore transaction," and (2) no "directed selling ef-
forts" could be made in the United States.182 An "offshore transaction" 
occurred when the offer was not made to a person in the United States 
and either the buyer was outside the United States183 or the transaction 
was executed on an established foreign securities exchange.1B4 
"Directed selling" meant any activity that conditioned the U.S. 
market for the sale of such securities, including road-shows185 and 
newspaper advertisements in the United States.186 Regulation S im-
175 !d. at 941. 
176 Testy, supra note 156, at 941. 
177 See id. 
178 Jd. 
179 Jd. 
180 I d.; RegulationS, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-230.904 (2002). 
181 Robert B. Robbins & Elizabeth A. Harris, Regulation S Ofjelings, § Background, July 
2002, LEXIS, Seide File (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials-Securities Law for Non secu-
rities Lawyers). 
182 I d. § Operation of Regulation S. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 A "road-show" is industry lingo for when an issuer travels to groups of interested in-
vestors to market its securities offerings. See, e.g., Mow/am Roadslww for US Investment, BBC 
NEws, Oct. 7, 1998, at http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/northern_ireland/latest_news/ 
187848.stm. 
186 Robbins & Harris, supra note 181, §Operation of RegulationS. 
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posed additional conditions depending on the nature of the issuer 
and the type of security being offered to further safeguard against the 
flow back of unregistered securities into the United States.187 
Promulgation of Regulation S was an important step for the SEC 
in soothing international concerns regarding the extraterritorial 
reach of U.S. securities laws.188 It not only gave issuers greater clarity 
regarding U.S. securities registration requirements, but it constrained 
application of those requirements from trampling on the sovereignty 
of other states.189 
2. Enforcement of Securities Anti-Fraud Provisions 
The SEC was created to enforce the laws contained in the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.190 Its pri-
mary mission is to promote stability within U.S. capital markets and, 
more importantly, protect investors through the aggressive enforce-
ment of the Acts' anti-fraud provisions. 191 As a result of this mandate, 
the anti-fraud provisions are considered a cornerstone of U.S. securi-
ties regulation and their territorial application is quite broad.192 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 charged the SEC with for-
mulating a rule to protect investors from securities fraud. 193 As a re-
sult, the Commission promulgated and passed Rule 10b-5, which 
made it unlawful for any person, by the use of interstate commerce, to 
"employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. "194 
At the time of the Rule's enactment, little attention was paid to its 
expansive territorial language since securities transactions were pri-
marily domestic in nature. 195 However, beginning in the 1960s, plain-
tiffs began filing lawsuits that sought to apply U.S. securities anti-fraud 
provisions, including Rule 10b-5, to international transactions.196 Al-
though the SEC and Congress had provided guidance on the territo-
187 Jd. 
1ss Id. § Background. 
189 Testy, supra note 156, at 955. 
190 See Securities and Exchange Commission, The SEC: Who We Are, What We Do, at 
http:/ /www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
191 See id. 
192 See DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 127-45 (1998). 
193 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, Title I, § 10, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2002)). 
194 Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). 
195 Testy, supra note 156, at 928. 
196 Shoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane). 
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riality of securities registration, they remained silent on the reach of 
the anti-fraud provisions_I97 
As a result, the federal courts were left to craft limits on lOb-5.198 
In doing so, two predominant tests for determining a court's subject 
matter jurisdiction over transnational transactions emerged: the "ef-
fects" test and the "conduct" test. 199 
a. The Effects Test 
The "effects" test was first announced in Shoenbaum v. Firstbrook, a 
case that involved a U.S. shareholder of a Canadian corporation trad-
ing on both the U.S. and Toronto Stock Exchanges who alleged fraud 
against the corporation and its directors.200 The Second Circuit held 
that subject matter jurisdiction existed over any case where fraudulent 
extraterritorial conduct had a substantial impact on the investors or 
markets of the United States.20I In reversing the district court, the 
court reasoned that Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act indi-
cated Congress' intention for the Act to protect both domestic inves-
tors and markets from fraudulent foreign transactions.2°2 
Since "substantial impact" is a vague standard determined on a 
case-by-case basis, this test seems to cast a broad jurisdictional net. 203 
Courts, however, have been restrained in using it-in cases where 
both parties are foreign citizens or entities, subject matter jurisdiction 
under the effects test has been declined.204 This limited use of the ef-
fects test has been rationalized as reflecting Congress' wish to protect 
only U.S. entities from securities fraud.205 
b. The Conduct Test 
The extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act most often 
occurs under the conduct test.206 Under this test, if significant conduct 
related to a securities fraud occurred in the United States, then a fed-
197 See Katherine J. Fick, Comment, Such Stuff as Law Are Made On: Interpreting the Ex-
change Act to Reach Transnational Fraud, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 441, 442. 
198 Testy, supra note 156, at 933. 
199 Id. 
2oo 405 F.2d at 204-05. 
2°1 Id. at 208. 
202 Fick, supra note 197, at 455. 
208 Id. 
2o4 Jd. 
2os See id. at 456. 
2os Jd. 
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eral court's jurisdiction is established regardless of the victim's national-
ity. 2°7 The extraterritorial reach of this test, however, depends on the 
circuit applying it. 208 The Second Circuit applies the most rigid inter-
pretation of the test, requiring that the acts done in the United States 
"directly cause" the losses suffered by investors.2°9 This means that the 
conduct occurring in the United States must satisfy each element of a 
lOb-5 cause of action, i.e., "the fraudulent statements or misrepresenta-
tions must originate in the United States, must be made with scienter 
and in connection with the sale or purchase of securities, and must 
cause the harm to those who claim to be defrauded."21° Conversely, acts 
that are "merely preparatory" to the alleged fraud are insufficient to 
satisfy tl1e test. 211 Moreover, when the parties are not U.S. citizens or 
entities and the securities are not traded on a U.S. exchange, there 
must be additional factors that tip the scales in favor ofjurisdiction.212 
Other circuits, including the Third, Eighth, and Ninth, approach 
the conduct test in a less rigid fashion. 213 Under their approach, any 
significant activity undertaken in the United States that furthers a 
fraudulent scheme can provide the basis for subject matter jurisdic-
tion.214 This broader formulation has resulted in subject matter juris-
diction being conferred in cases such as Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 215 
which involved the sale of foreign securities between West German 
and Mexican corporations controlled by a Bahamian holding compa-
nies and owned by citizens of Switzerland and Mexico.216 
In addition to varying formulations of the test, the circuit courts 
are also divided on whether the inquiry requires consideration of 
other factors. 217 Some courts have indicated that the nationality of the 
issuer and whether the action is brought by the SEC itself must also be 
weighed before conferring jurisdiction. 21s 
207 Testy, supra note 156, at 934. 
208 See id. 
209 /d. 
210 Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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c. The Restatement (Third) ofForeig;n Relations Law of the United States 
By far the broadest statement of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. 
securities law is that found in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Re-
lations Law of the United States (the Third Restatement).219 Although 
it has no binding effect on courts, the Third Restatement asserts, in 
part, that U.S. courts have jurisdiction with respect to conduct occur-
ring predominantly in the United States that is related to a transac-
tion in securities, even if the transaction itself takes place outside the 
United States.220 In determining jurisdiction, the Third Restatement 
also indicates that particular weight should be given to whether repre-
sentations are made or negotiations are conducted in the United 
States.221 Commentators have noted that this articulation of foreign 
relations law arguably extends the already expansive scope of the 
conduct and effects tests. 222 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Extraterritoriality and the Efficacy of International Capital Markets 
The price of a security reflects, in part, the costs and benefits asso-
ciated with the capital market on which that security is listed.223 Conse-
quently, the price of a security will vary according to its capital mar-
ket.224 For example, a security may be priced higher when it is listed on 
a U.S. exchange because the rigorous disclosure requirements raise 
transactional costs while the broad anti-fraud provisions provide inves-
tors and issuers a greater level of protection.225 That same security, 
however, may have a lower price on a foreign exchange because the 
costs involved and protections offered by that capital market are 
lower.226 Therefore, in a global securities marketplace, investors and 
issuers choose their capital markets, and the concomitant regulatory 
regimes, according to costs and benefits they desire.227 
219 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 416 (1986) (jurisdiction to Regulate Activities Related to Securities). 
220 /d.§ 416(1) (d). 
221 /d.§ 416(2)(b). 
222 Testy, supra note 156, at 936. 
223 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American 
Securities Law, 17 N.W.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 222 (1996). 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
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Critics suggest that the extraterritorial application of U.S. securi-
ties law has a negative impact on the global securities marketplace be-
cause it limits the ability of investors and issuers to select the securities 
regime of their own choosing. 228 When the jurisdiction of U.S. securi-
ties law unexpectedly ensnares a foreign transaction, the parties to 
that transaction lose the benefit of their bargain.229 The anticipated 
transactional costs and fraud protections of a foreign transaction are 
suddenly obscured by the intrusion of the highly developed and com-
plex U.S. regulatory regime.230 Ultimately, the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. securities law impedes capital mobility.231 Foreign issuers 
fearful of U.S. jurisdiction restrict U.S. investors from participating in 
their offering.232 This creates economic inefficiency in two ways: (1) 
U.S. investors are denied access to attractive foreign investments, and 
(2) issuers are denied the liquidity that access to U.S. capital markets 
would provide.233 
Therefore, Regulation S won praise because it established a level 
of predictability in the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities 
registration requirements.234 By providing clear territorial boundaries, 
Regulation S allowed investors and issuers to select foreign regulatory 
regimes without fearing the incursion of additional U.S. registration 
costs.235 
The territoriality of U.S. anti-fraud provisions, however, has not 
been similarly constrained.236 As most notably demonstrated by the 
conduct test, enforcement of U.S. anti-fraud laws can extend so far as 
to ensnare parties that neither reside in the United States nor have 
securities listed on U.S. exchanges.237 In addition, the territorial reach 
of U.S. anti-fraud provisions is made even more unpredictable by the 
fact that circuit courts are divided on what factors actually establish 
jurisdiction.238 As a result, investors and issuers engaging in interna-
228 Choi & Guzman, supra note 223, at 208. 
229 See id. at 221. 
280 See id. 
231 !d. at 224-25. 
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tional transactions continue to function in an uncertain regulatory 
environment with respect to U.S. anti-fraud provisions.239 
B. SOX and the Tenitorial Framework of U.S. SecUJities Regulation 
As illustrated above, the territoriality of U.S. securities laws is di-
chotomous.240 Whereas the extraterritorial application of U.S. regis-
tration requirements is restricted by Regulation S, the anti-fraud pro-
visions have a tendency to be applied more broadly.241 Although SOX 
radically changes the nature of U.S. securities regulation, as will be 
discussed below, it does not disrupt this territorial framework.242 
SOX applies to an "issuer" of securities on a U.S. exchange and the 
professionals who interact with that issuer.243 SOX defines an "issuer" as 
any issuer that is already required to register its securities pursuant to 
the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.244 
Thus, SOX only applies if and when an issuer becomes subject to U.S. 
registration requirements.245 Regulation S, however, governs when a 
foreign issuer must register its securities in the United States.246 There-
fore, the territorial application of SOX is directly limited by Regulation 
S because its provisions are only effective once the requirements for 
securities registration under Regulation S are satisfied. 247 
It is for this reason that SOX does not add further confusion or 
unpredictability to the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities 
law.248 Since it is not enforceable against corporations that do not de-
liberately choose to register securities on a U.S. exchange, there is no 
chance that SOX will unexpectedly ensnare a foreign transaction that 
would have formerly been free of U.S. jurisdiction before SOX's pas-
sage.249 Although foreign corporations with securities already listed on 
U.S. exchanges are having to accommodate SOX, the burden of addi-
tional regulation is a risk these corporations accepted when they en-
tered the U.S. capital markets.250 
2!9 See id. 
240 See id. at 933-58. 
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Since SOX does not appear to increase the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. securities law, one would imagine little opposition to SOX 
internationally.251 This, however, has not been the case.252 To under-
stand the controversy surrounding SOX abroad, therefore, it is impor-
tant to understand how SOX breaks from the norm of securities regula-
tion.253 
C. SOX Divergence from Traditional Methods of Securities Regulation 
The scandals of 2001 and 2002 demonstrated to Congress that no 
amount of financial disclosure would protect U.S. capital markets so 
long as company management continued to be corrupted by conflicts 
of interest rooted in flawed corporate organizational structures.254 
Regulating corporate governance, however, has traditionally been the 
realm of states and professional associations rather than the SEC.255 It 
is for this reason that SOX radically departs from the conventional 
forms of securities regulation by federalizing areas of law that were 
once the domains of non-federal organizations.256 
1. The Federalization of Corporate Governance 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
protected U.S. capital markets through two mechanisms: (1) rigorous 
registration and financial disclosure requirements, and (2) broad anti-
fraud provisions.257 In contrast, the organization of corporate entities 
has traditionally been an exclusive function of state law, while the legal 
and accounting professions have customarily been self-regulated.258 
However, the implosion of Enron and others revealed the flaws in the 
organizations and powers of the boards of directors to govern corpora-
tions.259 These scandals also highlighted the failures of accountants and 
attorneys to detect and report corporate mismanagement.260 The only 
251 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 2. 
252 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 11. 
25! See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
254 See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 4, at 219 (floor remarks of Sen. John 
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256 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
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conclusion Congress could draw from such examples was that a base 
line of principles and practices in corporate governance needed to be 
established for all public companies.261 Only then would financial dis-
closure become a meaningful indication of a company's performance 
and value.262 Consequently, by implementing provisions such as board 
audit committees, auditor services restrictions, and attorney conduct 
standards, SOX bridged the long standing divide between federal secu-
rities regulation, state corporate governance law, and professional self-
regulation. 263 
2. The Shock of SOX Abroad 
It is SOX's regulation of the corporate governance structure that 
has so enraged the international community.264 Before SOX, access to 
U.S. capital markets only required a foreign corporation to comply 
with registration and disclosure provisions.265 Thus, foreign corpora-
tions needed only to divulge the cold numbers behind their opera-
tions.266 With the adoption of SOX, however, access to these markets 
has been further restricted to those foreign corporations willing to 
reorganize their organizational structure and business practices.267 
Hence, SOX reaches beyond the registration and disclosure require-
ments first established by the 1933 and 1934 Acts and forces foreign 
corporations to conform to a model of corporate governance crafted 
by the U.S. Congress.268 
SOX offends the tradition of comity, which emphasizes deference 
to the laws of other concerned states, by failing to respect the cultural 
values reflected in the corporate organization of those states. 269 Indeed, 
the organization of a corporation often reflects a nation's cultural val-
ues.270 In Japan, for example, companies are organized in a manner 
261 See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 4, at 206-07. 
262 See id. at 205. 
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that reflects that culture's emphasis on collective decision-making.271 
The presence of employees on a German company's supervisory board, 
meanwhile, reflects that culture's emphasis on operating companies for 
the benefit of employees, not just investors.272 SOX's corporate govern-
ance model, in contrast, emphasizes independent oversight and indi-
vidual accountability.273 Ultimately, in order to adopt SOX's corporate 
governance model, foreign corporations are forced to either compro-
mise or abandon their own cultural values. 274 This is particularly ironic 
from the perspective of foreign corporations because the U.S. Congress 
crafted SOX as a response to corporate scandals that were very much 
an American phenomenon.275 
3. The Potential Effect on U.S. Capital Markets 
It is feared that the burdensome provisions of SOX will drive for-
eign issuers away from U.S. capital markets.276 Although this is true in 
a limited respect, over the long term, SOX will not diminish the ap-
peal of U.S. capital markets abroad.277 
There are benefits and drawbacks to increasing the rigor of securi-
ties regulation.278 Certainly, investors benefit from a regulatory regime 
that requires comprehensive financial disclosure and honest corporate 
governance practices. 279 Such a regime ultimately allows investors to 
better gauge the true value of corporations and their securities offer-
ings. 280 The drawback to enhanced securities regulation, however, is the 
burden of added transactional costs placed on issuers.281 Therefore, 
regulatory regimes must strike a balance that satisfies investors' needs 
for transparency against issuers' desires for manageable transactional 
costs.2s2 The danger regulatory regimes must avoid, of course, is driving 
271 See id. at 13. 
272 See Birk, supra note 119, at 67. 
273 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act§§ 101, 302, 307, 406. 
274 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 14-16. 
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280 See id. at 350. 
281 !d. 
282 See id. 
2004] International Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 527 
issuers away from a capital market with costly and unnecessary regula-
tion.283 
One criticism of SOX is that it creates a new tier of transactional 
costs that will drive foreign issuers away from the United States.284 
Thus, in an overzealous effort to rebuild investor confidence, SOX 
will diminish the appeal of U.S. capital markets abroad by imposing 
onerous disclosure and corporate governance requirements.285 At the 
surface level, this criticism appears to be justified-several companies 
have cited the enactment of SOX as the reason for their decision not 
to list on a U.S. exchange.286 
This criticism, however, is only justified in the short term.287 A 
closer examination reveals that companies based their decision not to 
list in the United States largely because the SEC had not yet finalized 
its rules for SOX.288 Without clear rules that govern how SOX will in-
teract with the laws of other countries, foreign corporations faced an 
uncertain regulatory environment.289 As one Japanese executive ex-
plained in regards to his company's decision not to enter the U.S. 
capital markets, "[w]e didn't know what the rules of the game we'd be 
playing [would be] ... [so] we wanted to know what we were getting 
into" before listing in the United States.290 This reasoning suggests 
that the impact of SOX in driving away foreign issuers is merely tem-
porary.291 Once the SEC finalizes its rules for SOX, the U.S. regula-
tory environment will stabilize and the uncertainty driving foreign 
issuers away will fade.292 
The burdensome nature of SOX itself will also have a minimal 
long-term impact. 293 The disclosure rules governing securities in the 
United States before SOX were already by far the most stringent and 
costly in the world. 294 Indeed, one commentator noted that, compared 
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to the United States, the disclosure requirements of other markets were 
"mere child's play. "295 The reward for foreign issuers listing on a U.S. 
exchange, however, was access to an enormous pool of capita1.296 Thus, 
before SOX, foreign issuers entering the U.S. capital markets already 
had to commit to costly, continuous investor relation programs and the 
time-consuming personal involvement of their top management.297 Al-
though there is no question that SOX is burdensome, when compared 
to the regulatory burdens that were already present in the United 
States, it represents only an incremental increase in that burden.298 
Therefore, because companies were willing to shoulder costly disclo-
sure requirements before SOX in order to reap the benefits of U.S. 
capital markets, it is unlikely that the incremental burdens imposed by 
SOX will result in a long-term decrease of foreign issuers on U.S. ex-
changes.299 
CoNcLUSION 
Unlike traditional securities regulations, SOX seeks to protect 
U.S. capital markets by regulating the manner in which corporations 
are governed. Although this approach does not broaden the extrater-
ritorial framework of securities regulation, it does ignore issues of 
comity with respect to the cultural values reflected in other nations' 
corporate organizations. However, despite the anger it has generated 
abroad, SOX will not diminish the desire of foreign issuers to enter 
U.S. capital markets because it only poses an incremental increase in 
the burden of U.S. securities regulation. 
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